Filtered by vendor Sigstore
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Total
4 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2022-36056 | 1 Sigstore | 1 Cosign | 2022-09-19 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| Cosign is a project under the sigstore organization which aims to make signatures invisible infrastructure. In versions prior to 1.12.0 a number of vulnerabilities have been found in cosign verify-blob, where Cosign would successfully verify an artifact when verification should have failed. First a cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify a blob even if the embedded rekorBundle does not reference the given signature. Second, when providing identity flags, the email and issuer of a certificate is not checked when verifying a Rekor bundle, and the GitHub Actions identity is never checked. Third, providing an invalid Rekor bundle without the experimental flag results in a successful verification. And fourth an invalid transparency log entry will result in immediate success for verification. Details and examples of these issues can be seen in the GHSA-8gw7-4j42-w388 advisory linked. Users are advised to upgrade to 1.12.0. There are no known workarounds for these issues. | |||||
| CVE-2022-35930 | 1 Sigstore | 1 Policy Controller | 2022-08-11 | N/A | 8.8 HIGH |
| PolicyController is a utility used to enforce supply chain policy in Kubernetes clusters. In versions prior to 0.2.1 PolicyController will report a false positive, resulting in an admission when it should not be admitted when there is at least one attestation with a valid signature and there are NO attestations of the type being verified (--type defaults to "custom"). An example image that can be used to test this is `ghcr.io/distroless/static@sha256:dd7614b5a12bc4d617b223c588b4e0c833402b8f4991fb5702ea83afad1986e2`. Users should upgrade to version 0.2.1 to resolve this issue. There are no workarounds for users unable to upgrade. | |||||
| CVE-2022-35929 | 1 Sigstore | 1 Cosign | 2022-08-10 | N/A | 9.8 CRITICAL |
| cosign is a container signing and verification utility. In versions prior to 1.10.1 cosign can report a false positive if any attestation exists. `cosign verify-attestation` used with the `--type` flag will report a false positive verification when there is at least one attestation with a valid signature and there are NO attestations of the type being verified (--type defaults to "custom"). This can happen when signing with a standard keypair and with "keyless" signing with Fulcio. This vulnerability can be reproduced with the `distroless.dev/static@sha256:dd7614b5a12bc4d617b223c588b4e0c833402b8f4991fb5702ea83afad1986e2` image. This image has a `vuln` attestation but not an `spdx` attestation. However, if you run `cosign verify-attestation --type=spdx` on this image, it incorrectly succeeds. This issue has been addressed in version 1.10.1 of cosign. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue. | |||||
| CVE-2022-23649 | 1 Sigstore | 1 Cosign | 2022-03-07 | 2.1 LOW | 3.3 LOW |
| Cosign provides container signing, verification, and storage in an OCI registry for the sigstore project. Prior to version 1.5.2, Cosign can be manipulated to claim that an entry for a signature exists in the Rekor transparency log even if it doesn't. This requires the attacker to have pull and push permissions for the signature in OCI. This can happen with both standard signing with a keypair and "keyless signing" with Fulcio. If an attacker has access to the signature in OCI, they can manipulate cosign into believing the entry was stored in Rekor even though it wasn't. The vulnerability has been patched in v1.5.2 of Cosign. The `signature` in the `signedEntryTimestamp` provided by Rekor is now compared to the `signature` that is being verified. If these don't match, then an error is returned. If a valid bundle is copied to a different signature, verification should fail. Cosign output now only informs the user that certificates were verified if a certificate was in fact verified. There is currently no known workaround. | |||||