Filtered by vendor Bytecodealliance
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15 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-26489 | 1 Bytecodealliance | 2 Cranelift-codegen, Wasmtime | 2023-03-15 | N/A | 9.9 CRITICAL |
| wasmtime is a fast and secure runtime for WebAssembly. In affected versions wasmtime's code generator, Cranelift, has a bug on x86_64 targets where address-mode computation mistakenly would calculate a 35-bit effective address instead of WebAssembly's defined 33-bit effective address. This bug means that, with default codegen settings, a wasm-controlled load/store operation could read/write addresses up to 35 bits away from the base of linear memory. Due to this bug, however, addresses up to `0xffffffff * 8 + 0x7ffffffc = 36507222004 = ~34G` bytes away from the base of linear memory are possible from guest code. This means that the virtual memory 6G away from the base of linear memory up to ~34G away can be read/written by a malicious module. A guest module can, without the knowledge of the embedder, read/write memory in this region. The memory may belong to other WebAssembly instances when using the pooling allocator, for example. Affected embedders are recommended to analyze preexisting wasm modules to see if they're affected by the incorrect codegen rules and possibly correlate that with an anomalous number of traps during historical execution to locate possibly suspicious modules. The specific bug in Cranelift's x86_64 backend is that a WebAssembly address which is left-shifted by a constant amount from 1 to 3 will get folded into x86_64's addressing modes which perform shifts. For example `(i32.load (i32.shl (local.get 0) (i32.const 3)))` loads from the WebAssembly address `$local0 << 3`. When translated to Cranelift the `$local0 << 3` computation, a 32-bit value, is zero-extended to a 64-bit value and then added to the base address of linear memory. Cranelift would generate an instruction of the form `movl (%base, %local0, 8), %dst` which calculates `%base + %local0 << 3`. The bug here, however, is that the address computation happens with 64-bit values, where the `$local0 << 3` computation was supposed to be truncated to a a 32-bit value. This means that `%local0`, which can use up to 32-bits for an address, gets 3 extra bits of address space to be accessible via this `movl` instruction. The fix in Cranelift is to remove the erroneous lowering rules in the backend which handle these zero-extended expression. The above example is then translated to `movl %local0, %temp; shl $3, %temp; movl (%base, %temp), %dst` which correctly truncates the intermediate computation of `%local0 << 3` to 32-bits inside the `%temp` register which is then added to the `%base` value. Wasmtime version 4.0.1, 5.0.1, and 6.0.1 have been released and have all been patched to no longer contain the erroneous lowering rules. While updating Wasmtime is recommended, there are a number of possible workarounds that embedders can employ to mitigate this issue if updating is not possible. Note that none of these workarounds are on-by-default and require explicit configuration: 1. The `Config::static_memory_maximum_size(0)` option can be used to force all accesses to linear memory to be explicitly bounds-checked. This will perform a bounds check separately from the address-mode computation which correctly calculates the effective address of a load/store. Note that this can have a large impact on the execution performance of WebAssembly modules. 2. The `Config::static_memory_guard_size(1 << 36)` option can be used to greatly increase the guard pages placed after linear memory. This will guarantee that memory accesses up-to-34G away are guaranteed to be semantically correct by reserving unmapped memory for the instance. Note that this reserves a very large amount of virtual memory per-instances and can greatly reduce the maximum number of concurrent instances being run. 3. If using a non-x86_64 host is possible, then that will also work around this bug. This bug does not affect Wasmtime's or Cranelift's AArch64 backend, for example. | |||||
| CVE-2023-27477 | 1 Bytecodealliance | 2 Cranelift-codegen, Wasmtime | 2023-03-15 | N/A | 4.3 MEDIUM |
| wasmtime is a fast and secure runtime for WebAssembly. Wasmtime's code generation backend, Cranelift, has a bug on x86_64 platforms for the WebAssembly `i8x16.select` instruction which will produce the wrong results when the same operand is provided to the instruction and some of the selected indices are greater than 16. There is an off-by-one error in the calculation of the mask to the `pshufb` instruction which causes incorrect results to be returned if lanes are selected from the second vector. This codegen bug has been fixed in Wasmtiem 6.0.1, 5.0.1, and 4.0.1. Users are recommended to upgrade to these updated versions. If upgrading is not an option for you at this time, you can avoid this miscompilation by disabling the Wasm simd proposal. Additionally the bug is only present on x86_64 hosts. Other platforms such as AArch64 and s390x are not affected. | |||||
| CVE-2021-32629 | 1 Bytecodealliance | 1 Cranelift-codegen | 2023-03-01 | 4.6 MEDIUM | 8.8 HIGH |
| Cranelift is an open-source code generator maintained by Bytecode Alliance. It translates a target-independent intermediate representation into executable machine code. There is a bug in 0.73 of the Cranelift x64 backend that can create a scenario that could result in a potential sandbox escape in a Wasm program. This bug was introduced in the new backend on 2020-09-08 and first included in a release on 2020-09-30, but the new backend was not the default prior to 0.73. The recently-released version 0.73 with default settings, and prior versions with an explicit build flag to select the new backend, are vulnerable. The bug in question performs a sign-extend instead of a zero-extend on a value loaded from the stack, under a specific set of circumstances. If those circumstances occur, the bug could allow access to memory addresses upto 2GiB before the start of the Wasm program heap. If the heap bound is larger than 2GiB, then it would be possible to read memory from a computable range dependent on the size of the heaps bound. The impact of this bug is highly dependent on heap implementation, specifically: * if the heap has bounds checks, and * does not rely exclusively on guard pages, and * the heap bound is 2GiB or smaller * then this bug cannot be used to reach memory from another Wasm program heap. The impact of the vulnerability is mitigated if there is no memory mapped in the range accessible using this bug, for example, if there is a 2 GiB guard region before the Wasm program heap. The bug in question performs a sign-extend instead of a zero-extend on a value loaded from the stack, when the register allocator reloads a spilled integer value narrower than 64 bits. This interacts poorly with another optimization: the instruction selector elides a 32-to-64-bit zero-extend operator when we know that an instruction producing a 32-bit value actually zeros the upper 32 bits of its destination register. Hence, we rely on these zeroed bits, but the type of the value is still i32, and the spill/reload reconstitutes those bits as the sign extension of the i32’s MSB. The issue would thus occur when: * An i32 value in a Wasm program is greater than or equal to 0x8000_0000; * The value is spilled and reloaded by the register allocator due to high register pressure in the program between the value’s definition and its use; * The value is produced by an instruction that we know to be “special� in that it zeroes the upper 32 bits of its destination: add, sub, mul, and, or; * The value is then zero-extended to 64 bits in the Wasm program; * The resulting 64-bit value is used. Under these circumstances there is a potential sandbox escape when the i32 value is a pointer. The usual code emitted for heap accesses zero-extends the Wasm heap address, adds it to a 64-bit heap base, and accesses the resulting address. If the zero-extend becomes a sign-extend, the program could reach backward and access memory up to 2GiB before the start of its heap. In addition to assessing the nature of the code generation bug in Cranelift, we have also determined that under specific circumstances, both Lucet and Wasmtime using this version of Cranelift may be exploitable. See referenced GitHub Advisory for more details. | |||||
| CVE-2022-39393 | 1 Bytecodealliance | 1 Wasmtime | 2022-11-17 | N/A | 8.6 HIGH |
| Wasmtime is a standalone runtime for WebAssembly. Prior to version 2.0.2, there is a bug in Wasmtime's implementation of its pooling instance allocator where when a linear memory is reused for another instance the initial heap snapshot of the prior instance can be visible, erroneously to the next instance. This bug has been patched and users should upgrade to Wasmtime 2.0.2. Other mitigations include disabling the pooling allocator and disabling the `memory-init-cow`. | |||||
| CVE-2022-39394 | 1 Bytecodealliance | 1 Wasmtime | 2022-11-16 | N/A | 9.8 CRITICAL |
| Wasmtime is a standalone runtime for WebAssembly. Prior to version 2.0.2, there is a bug in Wasmtime's C API implementation where the definition of the `wasmtime_trap_code` does not match its declared signature in the `wasmtime/trap.h` header file. This discrepancy causes the function implementation to perform a 4-byte write into a 1-byte buffer provided by the caller. This can lead to three zero bytes being written beyond the 1-byte location provided by the caller. This bug has been patched and users should upgrade to Wasmtime 2.0.2. This bug can be worked around by providing a 4-byte buffer casted to a 1-byte buffer when calling `wasmtime_trap_code`. Users of the `wasmtime` crate are not affected by this issue, only users of the C API function `wasmtime_trap_code` are affected. | |||||
| CVE-2022-39392 | 1 Bytecodealliance | 1 Wasmtime | 2022-11-15 | N/A | 7.4 HIGH |
| Wasmtime is a standalone runtime for WebAssembly. Prior to version 2.0.2, there is a bug in Wasmtime's implementation of its pooling instance allocator when the allocator is configured to give WebAssembly instances a maximum of zero pages of memory. In this configuration, the virtual memory mapping for WebAssembly memories did not meet the compiler-required configuration requirements for safely executing WebAssembly modules. Wasmtime's default settings require virtual memory page faults to indicate that wasm reads/writes are out-of-bounds, but the pooling allocator's configuration would not create an appropriate virtual memory mapping for this meaning out of bounds reads/writes can successfully read/write memory unrelated to the wasm sandbox within range of the base address of the memory mapping created by the pooling allocator. This bug is not applicable with the default settings of the `wasmtime` crate. This bug can only be triggered by setting `InstanceLimits::memory_pages` to zero. This is expected to be a very rare configuration since this means that wasm modules cannot allocate any pages of linear memory. All wasm modules produced by all current toolchains are highly likely to use linear memory, so it's expected to be unlikely that this configuration is set to zero by any production embedding of Wasmtime. This bug has been patched and users should upgrade to Wasmtime 2.0.2. This bug can be worked around by increasing the `memory_pages` allotment when configuring the pooling allocator to a value greater than zero. If an embedding wishes to still prevent memory from actually being used then the `Store::limiter` method can be used to dynamically disallow growth of memory beyond 0 bytes large. Note that the default `memory_pages` value is greater than zero. | |||||
| CVE-2022-31169 | 1 Bytecodealliance | 2 Cranelift-codegen, Wasmtime | 2022-08-03 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Wasmtime is a standalone runtime for WebAssembly. There is a bug in Wasmtime's code generator, Cranelift, for AArch64 targets where constant divisors can result in incorrect division results at runtime. This affects Wasmtime prior to version 0.38.2 and Cranelift prior to 0.85.2. This issue only affects the AArch64 platform. Other platforms are not affected. The translation rules for constants did not take into account whether sign or zero-extension should happen which resulted in an incorrect value being placed into a register when a division was encountered. The impact of this bug is that programs executing within the WebAssembly sandbox would not behave according to the WebAssembly specification. This means that it is hypothetically possible for execution within the sandbox to go awry and WebAssembly programs could produce unexpected results. This should not impact hosts executing WebAssembly but does affect the correctness of guest programs. This bug has been patched in Wasmtime version 0.38.2 and cranelift-codegen 0.85.2. There are no known workarounds. | |||||
| CVE-2022-31146 | 1 Bytecodealliance | 2 Cranelift-codegen, Wasmtime | 2022-07-27 | N/A | 8.8 HIGH |
| Wasmtime is a standalone runtime for WebAssembly. There is a bug in the Wasmtime's code generator, Cranelift, where functions using reference types may be incorrectly missing metadata required for runtime garbage collection. This means that if a GC happens at runtime then the GC pass will mistakenly think these functions do not have live references to GC'd values, reclaiming them and deallocating them. The function will then subsequently continue to use the values assuming they had not been GC'd, leading later to a use-after-free. This bug was introduced in the migration to the `regalloc2` register allocator that occurred in the Wasmtime 0.37.0 release on 2022-05-20. This bug has been patched and users should upgrade to Wasmtime version 0.38.2. Mitigations for this issue can be achieved by disabling the reference types proposal by passing `false` to `wasmtime::Config::wasm_reference_types` or downgrading to Wasmtime 0.36.0 or prior. | |||||
| CVE-2022-31104 | 1 Bytecodealliance | 2 Cranelift-codegen, Wasmtime | 2022-07-08 | 6.8 MEDIUM | 5.6 MEDIUM |
| Wasmtime is a standalone runtime for WebAssembly. In affected versions wasmtime's implementation of the SIMD proposal for WebAssembly on x86_64 contained two distinct bugs in the instruction lowerings implemented in Cranelift. The aarch64 implementation of the simd proposal is not affected. The bugs were presented in the `i8x16.swizzle` and `select` WebAssembly instructions. The `select` instruction is only affected when the inputs are of `v128` type. The correspondingly affected Cranelift instructions were `swizzle` and `select`. The `swizzle` instruction lowering in Cranelift erroneously overwrote the mask input register which could corrupt a constant value, for example. This means that future uses of the same constant may see a different value than the constant itself. The `select` instruction lowering in Cranelift wasn't correctly implemented for vector types that are 128-bits wide. When the condition was 0 the wrong instruction was used to move the correct input to the output of the instruction meaning that only the low 32 bits were moved and the upper 96 bits of the result were left as whatever the register previously contained (instead of the input being moved from). The `select` instruction worked correctly if the condition was nonzero, however. This bug in Wasmtime's implementation of these instructions on x86_64 represents an incorrect implementation of the specified semantics of these instructions according to the WebAssembly specification. The impact of this is benign for hosts running WebAssembly but represents possible vulnerabilities within the execution of a guest program. For example a WebAssembly program could take unintended branches or materialize incorrect values internally which runs the risk of exposing the program itself to other related vulnerabilities which can occur from miscompilations. We have released Wasmtime 0.38.1 and cranelift-codegen (and other associated cranelift crates) 0.85.1 which contain the corrected implementations of these two instructions in Cranelift. If upgrading is not an option for you at this time, you can avoid the vulnerability by disabling the Wasm simd proposal. Additionally the bug is only present on x86_64 hosts. Other aarch64 hosts are not affected. Note that s390x hosts don't yet implement the simd proposal and are not affected. | |||||
| CVE-2022-24791 | 1 Bytecodealliance | 1 Wasmtime | 2022-04-08 | 6.8 MEDIUM | 9.8 CRITICAL |
| Wasmtime is a standalone JIT-style runtime for WebAssembly, using Cranelift. There is a use after free vulnerability in Wasmtime when both running Wasm that uses externrefs and enabling epoch interruption in Wasmtime. If you are not explicitly enabling epoch interruption (it is disabled by default) then you are not affected. If you are explicitly disabling the Wasm reference types proposal (it is enabled by default) then you are also not affected. The use after free is caused by Cranelift failing to emit stack maps when there are safepoints inside cold blocks. Cold blocks occur when epoch interruption is enabled. Cold blocks are emitted at the end of compiled functions, and change the order blocks are emitted versus defined. This reordering accidentally caused Cranelift to skip emitting some stack maps because it expected to emit the stack maps in block definition order, rather than block emission order. When Wasmtime would eventually collect garbage, it would fail to find live references on the stack because of the missing stack maps, think that they were unreferenced garbage, and therefore reclaim them. Then after the collection ended, the Wasm code could use the reclaimed-too-early references, which is a use after free. Patches have been released in versions 0.34.2 and 0.35.2, which fix the vulnerability. All Wasmtime users are recommended to upgrade to these patched versions. If upgrading is not an option for you at this time, you can avoid the vulnerability by either: disabling the Wasm reference types proposal, config.wasm_reference_types(false); or by disabling epoch interruption if you were previously enabling it. config.epoch_interruption(false). | |||||
| CVE-2022-23636 | 1 Bytecodealliance | 1 Wasmtime | 2022-02-25 | 7.1 HIGH | 8.1 HIGH |
| Wasmtime is an open source runtime for WebAssembly & WASI. Prior to versions 0.34.1 and 0.33.1, there exists a bug in the pooling instance allocator in Wasmtime's runtime where a failure to instantiate an instance for a module that defines an `externref` global will result in an invalid drop of a `VMExternRef` via an uninitialized pointer. A number of conditions listed in the GitHub Security Advisory must be true in order for an instance to be vulnerable to this issue. Maintainers believe that the effective impact of this bug is relatively small because the usage of `externref` is still uncommon and without a resource limiter configured on the `Store`, which is not the default configuration, it is only possible to trigger the bug from an error returned by `mprotect` or `VirtualAlloc`. Note that on Linux with the `uffd` feature enabled, it is only possible to trigger the bug from a resource limiter as the call to `mprotect` is skipped. The bug has been fixed in 0.34.1 and 0.33.1 and users are encouraged to upgrade as soon as possible. If it is not possible to upgrade to version 0.34.1 or 0.33.1 of the `wasmtime` crate, it is recommend that support for the reference types proposal be disabled by passing `false` to `Config::wasm_reference_types`. Doing so will prevent modules that use `externref` from being loaded entirely. | |||||
| CVE-2021-39216 | 2 Bytecodealliance, Fedoraproject | 2 Wasmtime, Fedora | 2021-12-21 | 3.3 LOW | 6.3 MEDIUM |
| Wasmtime is an open source runtime for WebAssembly & WASI. In Wasmtime from version 0.19.0 and before version 0.30.0 there was a use-after-free bug when passing `externref`s from the host to guest Wasm content. To trigger the bug, you have to explicitly pass multiple `externref`s from the host to a Wasm instance at the same time, either by passing multiple `externref`s as arguments from host code to a Wasm function, or returning multiple `externref`s to Wasm from a multi-value return function defined in the host. If you do not have host code that matches one of these shapes, then you are not impacted. If Wasmtime's `VMExternRefActivationsTable` became filled to capacity after passing the first `externref` in, then passing in the second `externref` could trigger a garbage collection. However the first `externref` is not rooted until we pass control to Wasm, and therefore could be reclaimed by the collector if nothing else was holding a reference to it or otherwise keeping it alive. Then, when control was passed to Wasm after the garbage collection, Wasm could use the first `externref`, which at this point has already been freed. We have reason to believe that the effective impact of this bug is relatively small because usage of `externref` is currently quite rare. The bug has been fixed, and users should upgrade to Wasmtime 0.30.0. If you cannot upgrade Wasmtime yet, you can avoid the bug by disabling reference types support in Wasmtime by passing `false` to `wasmtime::Config::wasm_reference_types`. | |||||
| CVE-2021-39219 | 2 Bytecodealliance, Fedoraproject | 2 Wasmtime, Fedora | 2021-12-21 | 3.3 LOW | 6.3 MEDIUM |
| Wasmtime is an open source runtime for WebAssembly & WASI. Wasmtime before version 0.30.0 is affected by a type confusion vulnerability. As a Rust library the `wasmtime` crate clearly marks which functions are safe and which are `unsafe`, guaranteeing that if consumers never use `unsafe` then it should not be possible to have memory unsafety issues in their embeddings of Wasmtime. An issue was discovered in the safe API of `Linker::func_*` APIs. These APIs were previously not sound when one `Engine` was used to create the `Linker` and then a different `Engine` was used to create a `Store` and then the `Linker` was used to instantiate a module into that `Store`. Cross-`Engine` usage of functions is not supported in Wasmtime and this can result in type confusion of function pointers, resulting in being able to safely call a function with the wrong type. Triggering this bug requires using at least two `Engine` values in an embedding and then additionally using two different values with a `Linker` (one at the creation time of the `Linker` and another when instantiating a module with the `Linker`). It's expected that usage of more-than-one `Engine` in an embedding is relatively rare since an `Engine` is intended to be a globally shared resource, so the expectation is that the impact of this issue is relatively small. The fix implemented is to change this behavior to `panic!()` in Rust instead of silently allowing it. Using different `Engine` instances with a `Linker` is a programmer bug that `wasmtime` catches at runtime. This bug has been patched and users should upgrade to Wasmtime version 0.30.0. If you cannot upgrade Wasmtime and are using more than one `Engine` in your embedding it's recommended to instead use only one `Engine` for the entire program if possible. An `Engine` is designed to be a globally shared resource that is suitable to have only one for the lifetime of an entire process. If using multiple `Engine`s is required then code should be audited to ensure that `Linker` is only used with one `Engine`. | |||||
| CVE-2021-39218 | 2 Bytecodealliance, Fedoraproject | 2 Wasmtime, Fedora | 2021-12-10 | 3.3 LOW | 6.3 MEDIUM |
| Wasmtime is an open source runtime for WebAssembly & WASI. In Wasmtime from version 0.26.0 and before version 0.30.0 is affected by a memory unsoundness vulnerability. There was an invalid free and out-of-bounds read and write bug when running Wasm that uses `externref`s in Wasmtime. To trigger this bug, Wasmtime needs to be running Wasm that uses `externref`s, the host creates non-null `externrefs`, Wasmtime performs a garbage collection (GC), and there has to be a Wasm frame on the stack that is at a GC safepoint where there are no live references at this safepoint, and there is a safepoint with live references earlier in this frame's function. Under this scenario, Wasmtime would incorrectly use the GC stack map for the safepoint from earlier in the function instead of the empty safepoint. This would result in Wasmtime treating arbitrary stack slots as `externref`s that needed to be rooted for GC. At the *next* GC, it would be determined that nothing was referencing these bogus `externref`s (because nothing could ever reference them, because they are not really `externref`s) and then Wasmtime would deallocate them and run `<ExternRef as Drop>::drop` on them. This results in a free of memory that is not necessarily on the heap (and shouldn't be freed at this moment even if it was), as well as potential out-of-bounds reads and writes. Even though support for `externref`s (via the reference types proposal) is enabled by default, unless you are creating non-null `externref`s in your host code or explicitly triggering GCs, you cannot be affected by this bug. We have reason to believe that the effective impact of this bug is relatively small because usage of `externref` is currently quite rare. This bug has been patched and users should upgrade to Wasmtime version 0.30.0. If you cannot upgrade Wasmtime at this time, you can avoid this bug by disabling the reference types proposal by passing `false` to `wasmtime::Config::wasm_reference_types`. | |||||
| CVE-2021-43790 | 1 Bytecodealliance | 1 Lucet | 2021-12-01 | 6.8 MEDIUM | 8.1 HIGH |
| Lucet is a native WebAssembly compiler and runtime. There is a bug in the main branch of `lucet-runtime` affecting all versions published to crates.io that allows a use-after-free in an Instance object that could result in memory corruption, data race, or other related issues. This bug was introduced early in the development of Lucet and is present in all releases. As a result of this bug, and dependent on the memory backing for the Instance objects, it is possible to trigger a use-after-free when the Instance is dropped. Users should upgrade to the main branch of the Lucet repository. Lucet no longer provides versioned releases on crates.io. There is no way to remediate this vulnerability without upgrading. | |||||