An issue was discovered in Suricata before 6.0.4. It is possible to bypass/evade any HTTP-based signature by faking an RST TCP packet with random TCP options of the md5header from the client side. After the three-way handshake, it's possible to inject an RST ACK with a random TCP md5header option. Then, the client can send an HTTP GET request with a forbidden URL. The server will ignore the RST ACK and send the response HTTP packet for the client's request. These packets will not trigger a Suricata reject action.
References
Link | Resource |
---|---|
https://github.com/OISF/suricata/releases | Release Notes Third Party Advisory |
https://redmine.openinfosecfoundation.org/issues/4710 | Exploit Issue Tracking Patch Vendor Advisory |
https://forum.suricata.io/t/suricata-6-0-4-and-5-0-8-released/1942 | Release Notes Vendor Advisory |
https://github.com/OISF/suricata/commit/50e2b973eeec7172991bf8f544ab06fb782b97df | Patch Third Party Advisory |
Information
Published : 2021-12-15 21:15
Updated : 2022-01-04 08:48
NVD link : CVE-2021-45098
Mitre link : CVE-2021-45098
JSON object : View
CWE
Products Affected
debian
- debian_linux
oisf
- suricata