TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.
References
Link | Resource |
---|---|
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20-zhang-yue.pdf | Exploit Third Party Advisory |
http://software-dl.ti.com/simplelink/esd/simplelink_cc13x2_26x2_sdk/3.20.00.68/exports/changelog.html | Vendor Advisory |
Configurations
Configuration 1 (hide)
|
Information
Published : 2021-09-20 13:15
Updated : 2021-10-07 06:13
NVD link : CVE-2020-16630
Mitre link : CVE-2020-16630
JSON object : View
CWE
CWE-863
Incorrect Authorization
Products Affected
ti
- ble5-stack
- 15.4-stack
- real-time_operating_system
- dynamic_multi-protocal_manager
- easylink
- openthread
- z-stack