The signature verification routine in Enigmail before 2.0.7 interprets user ids as status/control messages and does not correctly keep track of the status of multiple signatures, which allows remote attackers to spoof arbitrary email signatures via public keys containing crafted primary user ids.
References
Link | Resource |
---|---|
https://www.enigmail.net/index.php/en/download/changelog | Exploit Vendor Advisory |
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2018/06/13/10 | Mailing List Third Party Advisory |
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/04/30/4 | Mailing List Third Party Advisory |
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/Apr/38 | Mailing List Third Party Advisory |
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/152703/Johnny-You-Are-Fired.html | Third Party Advisory VDB Entry |
https://github.com/RUB-NDS/Johnny-You-Are-Fired/blob/master/paper/johnny-fired.pdf | |
https://github.com/RUB-NDS/Johnny-You-Are-Fired |
Configurations
Information
Published : 2018-06-13 16:29
Updated : 2019-05-16 11:29
NVD link : CVE-2018-12019
Mitre link : CVE-2018-12019
JSON object : View
CWE
CWE-347
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Products Affected
enigmail
- enigmail