An issue was discovered on Vera VeraEdge 1.7.19 and Veralite 1.7.481 devices. The device provides UPnP services that are available on port 3480 and can also be accessed via port 80 using the url "/port_3480". It seems that the UPnP services provide "request_image" as one of the service actions for a normal user to retrieve an image from a camera that is controlled by the controller. It seems that the "res" (resolution) parameter passed in the query string is not sanitized and is stored on the stack which allows an attacker to overflow the buffer. The function "LU::Generic_IP_Camera_Manager::REQ_Image" is activated when the lu_request_image is passed as the "id" parameter in the query string. This function then calls "LU::Generic_IP_Camera_Manager::GetUrlFromArguments". This function retrieves all the parameters passed in the query string including "res" and then uses the value passed in it to fill up buffer using the sprintf function. However, the function in this case lacks a simple length check and as a result an attacker who is able to send more than 184 characters can easily overflow the values stored on the stack including the $RA value and thus execute code on the device.
References
| Link | Resource |
|---|---|
| https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/Jun/8 | Mailing List Third Party Advisory |
| https://github.com/ethanhunnt/IoT_vulnerabilities/blob/master/Vera_sec_issues.pdf | Exploit Third Party Advisory |
| http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/153242/Veralite-Veraedge-Router-XSS-Command-Injection-CSRF-Traversal.html | Third Party Advisory VDB Entry |
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Information
Published : 2019-06-17 14:15
Updated : 2019-06-20 06:29
NVD link : CVE-2017-9392
Mitre link : CVE-2017-9392
JSON object : View
CWE
CWE-119
Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
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Products Affected
getvera
- veralite_firmware
- veraedge
- veraedge_firmware
- veralite